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Estate of LoMastro v. American Family Ins., 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 89 (Oct.
30, 2008) 1
INSURANCE LAW
Summary
Appeal from a district court judgment in an insurance matter and from a postjudgment order denying an NRCP 60(b) motion to set aside the judgment.
Disposition/ Outcome
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, dismissed in part, and remanded.
Factual and procedural History
This matter arose from a single-vehicle rollover accident that claimed Matthew
LoMastro’s life in April 2005. The vehicle’s owner, Chad Leach was a friend of Matthew’s, and
a passenger in the vehicle. In May 2005, Matthew’s parents, the LoMastros, discovered that
Leach did not maintain automobile insurance on the vehicle. Thus, to recover insurance
proceeds, the LoMastros made a claim with their insurance company, American Family
Insurance Group under the uninsured motorist provision of their policy. American Family
denied the claim, contending that, under Nevada law, uninsured motorist coverage does not
apply to single-vehicle accidents.
Meanwhile, the LoMastros instituted a civil action against Leach claiming that he
negligently entrusted his vehicle to Matthew and caused Matthew’s death. Leach failed to answer
the complaint and the LoMastros eventually had default entered against them. After being
informed of default entry, American Family moved to intervene in the action against Leach. The
district court granted this motion prior to default judgment being entered. To the motion to
intervene, American Family attached an answer in intervention attempting, among other things,
to contest Leach’s liability. The LoMastros moved to strike the answer in intervention arguing it
was untimely. The district court found the motion timely and thus denied the motion to strike,
but held that the entry of default precluded American Family from contesting Leach’s liability.
The LoMastros then filed an amended complaint and a second amended complaint, which
asserted new causes of action against American Family directly, including claims for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and violations of the Nevada Unfair Claims
Practices Act. 2 American Family answered the second amended complaint, denying the
allegations against Leach and itself, and then moved for summary judgment on all of the causes
of action in the complaint. After determining that uninsured motorist coverage does not apply to
single-vehicle accidents, the district court granted American Family’s motion for summary
judgment on all claims against it. 3 Thereafter, the LoMastros moved to amend or set aside the
1

By Tara Zimmerman
These amended complaints did not alter the allegations against Leach.
3
The district court also entered default judgment against Leach in the amount of $3 million.
2

summary judgment in favor of American Family under NRCP 59(e) and 60(b). The district court
denied that motion, affirming its summary judgment. This appeal followed.
Discussion
Entry of default against Leach was sufficient to bind American Family
In Nevada, an insurance company “is bound by the result of an action between its insured
and an uninsured motorist when the carrier has notice of the action but elects not to
intervene.” 4 Additionally, when an intervener intervenes, it “is bound by all prior orders and
adjudications of fact and law as though [it] had been a party from the commencement of the
suit.” 5 In regards the issue of whether an entry if default is sufficient to bind an intervener, the
court concluded that when an intervener wishes to assert defenses to liability on behalf of the
original defendant, it must intervene before entry of default or move to set aside the default. The
Court reasoned that because entry of default acts as an admission by the defending party of all
material claims made in the complaint, 6 it generally resolves the issues of liability and causation
and leaves open only the extent of damages. 7
Here, the court concluded that because American Family intervened after the entry of
default, despite having notice of the LoMastros’ intent to seek default, it was limited, on the
claims against Leach, to contesting the amount of damages, or alternatively, it could have moved
to set aside the entry of default.
American Family put forth two arguments to contest the conclusion that they were bound
by the entry of default. First, American Insurance argued that under Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Pietrosh 8 it would have been bound only upon the entry of default judgment. The court rejected
this argument. The Court reasoned that nothing in the Court’s conclusion in Pietrosh indicates
that insurers are only bound by default judgments. 9 In Pietrosh, the court invalidated an
exclusion in an uninsured motorist policy that a judgment obtained against an uninsured motorist
would not bind the insurer unless the insurer consented to the litigation. 10 The court recognized
that the exclusion would be reasonable if the insurance company did not have notice of the
litigation or if judgment was obtained by default but held that an insurance company with notice
should be bound by a judgment obtained through adversarial proceedings despite contrary rules
regarding privity in using a judgment against a party by estoppel. 11,12 Thus, the Court concluded
4

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Wharton, 88 Nev. 183, 187 n.7, 495 P.2d 359, 362 n.7 (1972) (citing State Farm
Mut. Auto. v. Christensen, 88 Nev. 160, 494 P.2d 552 (1972); Pietrosh, 85 Nev. 310, 454 P.2d 106 (1969)).
5
Galbreath v. Metro. Trust Co., 134 F.2d 569, 570 (10th Cir. 1943). See also Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605,
615 (1983) (“[P]ermission to intervene does not carry with it the right to relitigate matters already determined in the
case, unless those matters would otherwise be subject to reconsideration.”).
6
See Ewing v. Jennings, 15 Nev. 379, 382 (1880) (holding that defaulting is an admission of all averments in the
complaint); Nev. Civ. Prac. Manual § 10.04[5] (Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. ed., 5th ed. 2007) (“If the
defendant is in default, then all well-pleaded facts will be deemed admitted, except as to items of damages. Thus,
liability will be assumed and the inquiry generally will focus on proof of the amount of damages.”).
7
Nev. Civ. Prac. Manual, supra note 6, at § 10.04[5].
8
85 Nev. 310, 454 P.2d 106.
9
Id. at 316, 454 P.2d at 111.
10
Id. at 316-17, 454 P.2d at 110-11.
11
Id.
12
The Court noted that they expanded on the Pietrosh analysis in State Farm Mut. Auto. v. Christensen, by
ultimately determining that a default judgment bound an insurer that chose not to intervene in the action against the
uninsured motorist. 88 Nev. at 162-63, 494 P.2d at 553.

that their reasoning in Pietrosh, which was expanded in Christensen, supports their conclusion
that the entry of default bound American Family in this case.
Second, American Family asserted that the district court improperly applied Eckerson v.
Rudy. 13 The Court agreed that the Eckerson analysis was inapplicable to this case. In Eckerson,
the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed a district court order denying a motion to intervene because
not only was a default judgment entered against the defendant, but the judgment had been
satisfied. 14,15 The Court concluded that Eckerson was inapposite because it addressed the
timeliness of motions to intervene, whereas in this case the issue addressed was the effect of the
entry of default against the uninsured motorist on an intervener. Here, since neither the
LoMastros nor American Family challenged the district court’s order granting the motion to
intervene in this appeal, the Court concluded that although the district court improperly applied
the Eckerson analysis, it correctly determined that American Family was bound by the entry of
default.
The district court erred when it held that Nevada law requires a collision between two vehicles
for recovery of uninsured motorist benefits
American Family argued that the court should interpret the LoMastros’ policy and
Nevada law to require physical contact between an insured or an insured’s vehicle and an
uninsured vehicle before coverage is invoked. First, American Family argued that the
Legislature’s use of the phrase “other vehicle” in NRS 687B.145(2) indicates it contemplated
the involvement of two cars in accidents giving rise to claims for uninsured or underinsured
motorist benefits. 16 But the Court points out that “other vehicle” could refer to a vehicle other
than the one for which a policy is being issued, without requiring a collision between the insured
car and the uninsured. When a statute “is capable of being understood in two or more senses by
reasonably informed persons, the statute is ambiguous.” 17 Because NRS 687B.145(2) has two
reasonable interpretations, it must be interpreted according to the Legislature’s intent. 18
The Court has previously stated that the clear intent of the Legislature in requiring
insurance companies to offer uninsured motorist coverage was to compensate an injured insured
for injuries caused by the negligence of the owner or operator of an uninsured or underinsured
motor vehicle. 19 In light of that legislative intent, the Court has also stated that they “construe
13

72 Nev. 97, 295 P.2d 399 (1956).
Id. at 98-99, 295 P.2d at 399.
15
The court discussed a similar case, Lopez v. Merit Ins. Co., in which the Court stated that Eckerson was consistent
with other cases preventing intervention after the entry of a final judgment and reversed a district court order
allowing an insurance company to intervene in a case against an underinsured driver. 109 Nev. 553, 557, 853 P.2d
1266, 1268 (1993). In Lopez, the Court specifically declined to address whether the default judgment against the
underinsured driver would bind the insurance company in a later proceeding. Id. at 558, 853 P.2d at 1269.
16
NRS 687B.145(2) requires that insurance policies “contain a provision which enables the insured to recover up to
the limits of his own coverage any amount of damages for bodily injury from his insurer which he is legally entitled
to recover from the owner or operator of the other vehicle. . . ” (emphasis added).
17
McKay v. Bd. of Supervisors, 102 Nev. 644, 649, 730 P.2d 438, 442 (1986).
18
State, Div. of Ins. v. State Farm, 116 Nev. 290, 294, 995 P.2d 482, 485 (2000).
19
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Pilosof, 110 Nev. 311, 314, 871 P.2d 351, 353-54 (1994) (“Uninsured motorist coverage is
first-party coverage that fills the void left by uninsured parties who are liable for injuries resulting from vehicular
accidents.”); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Hinkel, 87 Nev. 478, 482, 488 P.2d 1151, 1153 (1971) (“It is [the] clear
intent of the legislature that NRS 693.115(1) requires protection against the peril of injury caused by an uninsured
motorist to a ‘person insured.’ The legislative purpose in creating compulsory uninsured motorist coverage was to
give needed relief to injured parties through insurance paid for by the insured.”).
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our [uninsured and underinsured motorist] statutes in favor of recovery by the insured.” 20 [40]
Thus, the Court concluded that because the plain language of NRS 687B.145(2) does not limit
recovery of uninsured motorist benefits to accidents involving more than one vehicle and since
such a limitation would unnecessarily limit an insured’s ability to recover for his or her injuries
in contravention of the legislative intent, NRS 687B.145(2) should not be read as prohibiting
recovery of uninsured motorist benefits for single-vehicle accidents.
American Family next argued that the “physical contact” requirement in NRS
690B.020(3)(f) applies to all accidents for which recovery of uninsured motorist benefits are
sought. 21 However, the Court reasoned that because NRS 690B.020(3) has several alternate
definitions of “uninsured motorist” separated by the word “or,” and requires physical contact to
satisfy only one of those definitions, the plain language of NRS 690B.020(3) indicates that the
“physical contact” requirement applies only to accidents involving unidentified or hit-and-run
motorists. Thus, the Court concluded NRS 690B.020 does not require physical contact between
two vehicles for recovery of uninsured motorist benefits.
American Family next argued that Kern v. Nevada Insurance Guaranty precludes
recovery. In Kern, the Court specifically addressed NRS 690B.020(3)(f)(1). 22,23 In Kern, the
Court stated, “[m]ost jurisdictions recognize that the purpose behind the ‘physical contact’
requirement is to prevent fraudulent claims where the insured loses control of his or her car and
claims a ‘phantom driver’ forced him or her off the road.” 24 However, the Court stated here that
the purpose clarified in Kern only applies in situations where the party at fault is unknown or
unidentifiable. Thus, the court concluded that in a case like this one, where the identity of the
alleged tortfeasor is known, the physical contact requirement serves no purpose and is thus
inapplicable.
Finally, American Family urged the Nevada Supreme Court to adopt the view taken by
the federal district court applying Texas law. In Burton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., the federal court held physical contact was required in order to recover uninsured
motorist benefits. 25 The Court concluded that the federal court’s analysis of physical contact
was only dicta and that the analysis does not suggest that the court intended to state a “physical
contact” requirement for all uninsured motorist claims. The Court further stated, that even if the
federal court did want to make a general “physical contact” requirement, that court’s dicta does
not persuade this Court that Nevada should adopt such a requirement.

20

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Maglish, 94 Nev. 699, 702, 586 P.2d 313, 314 (1978).
NRS 690B.020(1) requires insurance companies to offer coverage “for the protection of persons insured
thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages, from owners or operators of uninsured or hit-and-run motor
vehicles, for bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of
the uninsured or hit-and-run motor vehicle.”
22
NRS 690B.020(3)(f)(1) requires physical contact between a motorist and an unidentified vehicle for that vehicle
to meet one of the statutory definitions of “uninsured motor vehicle.”
23
109 Nev. 752, 754, 856 P.2d 1390, 1392 (1993).
24
Id. at 755, 856 P.2d at 1392.
25
In Burton, the court considered an accident in which two family members were injured in a single-car accident
caused by a third family member’s negligent driving. 869 F. Supp. 480, 483 (1994). After determining that no
liability or uninsured motorist coverage was available because of various policy exclusions, the court then addressed
the lack of physical contact with an uninsured vehicle. Id. at 488. By addressing the physical contact issue, the
federal court apparently meant to preclude any other claim for uninsured motorist benefits based on a phantom
driver not previously alleged.
21

On appeal, the LoMastros also asserted that summary judgment was improper on the
claims they made against American Family for bad faith denial of their insurance claim and
violations of the Unfair Claims Practices Act. In regards to the bad faith claim, the Court
concluded that because they reversed summary judgment on the physical contact issue, a genuine
issue of material fact remains as to whether American Family had a reasonable basis to deny the
LoMastros’ claim, and thus reversed summary judgment on the bad faith claim as well. 26
The Court further concluded that the district court erred by granting summary judgment
to American Family on the LoMastros’ claim for violations of the Unfair Claims Practices
Act. 27 The Court stated that based on the facts the LoMastros alleged 28 there is a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether American Family violated the Act, and summary judgment was
improper.
Conclusion
The Court affirmed the district court’s order that American Family was bound by the
entry of default against Leach because entry of default binds an insurance company intervener as
to the liability of an uninsured motorist defendant if the insurance company had notice of the
litigation and the plaintiff’s intent to seek entry of default, but failed to intervene. The Court
stated that on remand, American Family may contest only the amount of damages in the claims
against Leach or, in the alternative, American Family can move to have the default set aside.
In regards to summary judgment, the Court concluded that the district court erred when it
granted summary judgment to American Family. The Court reasoned that the law does not, in all
cases, require physical contact between at least two cars for recovery of uninsured motorist
benefits. Therefore, the district court’s grant of summary judgment was reversed as a matter of
law. Additionally, because reversal of summary judgment on that matter creates a genuine issue
of material fact regarding the LoMastros’ allegation that American Family denied their claim in
bad faith the district court’s grant of summary judgment on that claim was reversed. And finally,
the Court concluded that the district court further erred when it granted summary judgment for
American Family on the LoMastros’ claims of violation of the Unfair Claims Practices Act
because genuine issues of material fact exist as to the reasonableness of American Family’s
investigation and the manner in which it denied the LoMastros’ claim. Therefore, the Court
reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to American Family on all grounds and
remanded the matter for further proceedings.29
26

The LoMastros can recover for bad faith if they can prove that American Family refused their claim “‘without
proper cause’” and that the claim was “for a loss covered by the policy.” Pemberton v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 109 Nev.
789, 793, 858 P.2d 380, 382 (1993) (quoting United States Fid. v. Peterson, 91 Nev. 617, 620, 540 P.2d 1070, 1071
(1975)).
27
NRS 686A.310(1) identifies prohibitions as unfair practice
28
The Court listed the following facts as being pertinent: that American Family did not promptly respond to the
LoMastros’ communications, that the ten-month period in which it investigated the claim without affirming or
denying coverage was unreasonable, and that it did not provide sufficient explanation for denying the claim
29
The LoMastros have appealed the district court’s order denying their motion to amend the judgment under NRCP
59(e) or to set aside the judgments under NRCP 60(b). To the extent that the district court’s order denied their
NRCP 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment, it is not an appealable order. See Edwards v. Emperor’s Garden
Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 323 n.4, 130 P.3d 1280, 1284 n.4 (2006). And in light of this opinion, the LoMastros’ appeal
from the district court’s order denying their NRCP 60(b) motion to set aside the judgments is dismissed as moot.

